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How legal institutions relate to financial development and long-run growth is of central importance in eco-
nomics. Nonetheless, the real and financial effects of legal systems continue to be widely debated (Levine,
2005; Zingales, 2015). Evaluating these effects is a significant challenge because numerous factors lead to
cross-national differences in economic development (Sala-i-Martin et al., 2004; Dippel, 2014). Moreover,
institutions take shape alongside real outcomes, making it difficult to identify the causal linkages between
law, finance, and growth.
Motivated by these concerns, we evaluate the long-run consequences of legal institutions using quasi-
experimental variation in court enforcement in a within-country setting – Native American reservations in
the United States. Evidence from this setting shows that stronger and more predictable contract enforcement
leads to stronger credit markets, which in turn facilitates economic development. These differences matter.
Economic development is lower on reservations than in areas nearby, but differences in court enforcement
explain up to 70 percent of the reservation income gap.
Reservation economies are an ideal setting for studying the real and financial effects of legal insti-
tutions. Specifically, the U.S. Congress imposed sharp, long-run differences in court enforcement across
reservations by passing Public Law 280 (PL280) in 1953. Congress proposed PL280 for reasons unrelated
to credit markets and development prospects, but a provision added to the final version of the law assigned
state courts to adjudicate contract disputes on a subset of reservations without consent from tribes (Anderson
and Parker, 2008). Meanwhile, reservations unaffected by PL280 settle disputes in their own tribal courts. In
comparison to tribal courts, state courts provide stronger and more predictable contract enforcement, in part
because their precedent is better understood (Mudd, 1972; Parker, 2012). Moreover, reservations exhibit
substantially less heterogeneity in culture, geography, and trade than the cross-national setting. Because
affected and unaffected reservations had similar credit market conditions prior to the law, the variation in
adjudication arising from PL280 is a unique opportunity to test how legal enforcement affects credit markets
and real economic activity.
The first stage of our empirical analysis shows that PL280 created long-lasting differences in credit
market activity. Data on small business lending from the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Coun-
cil (FFIEC) allow us to construct reservation-specific measures of business credit. On average, counties
hosting a reservation that falls under state court jurisdiction have almost 40 percent more small business
lending compared to corresponding counties with tribal courts. To gauge the representativeness of these
findings and to address the possibility that borrowers excluded from the market for small business lending
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could conceivably substitute towards alternative funding sources, we also employ borrower-level data from
the FRBNY Consumer Credit Panel. Similarly, consumer credit scores are approximately 13 points lower
(roughly equal to the standard deviation of state-level averages) on reservations under tribal jurisdiction. In
addition, data from the FDIC show that community bank branching activity is substantially greater under
state courts than tribal courts. This evidence confirms speculation among lenders (via survey) that more
certainty over contract enforcement would improve credit conditions on reservations.1
Next, we verify that stronger legal enforcement not only affects credit markets, but leads to greater
economic activity. Recent research finds that incomes are higher on reservations where state courts enforce
and adjudicate contracts, according to data from the decennial U.S. Census from 1969 to 1999 (Anderson
and Parker, 2008). We confirm this result using annual, county-level data from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis, and an empirical approach that flexibly controls for unobserved regional determinants of economic
outcomes by benchmarking the effects of state courts in reservation counties against the economic activity
of surrounding counties. Reservation incomes are 10 percent lower on average than incomes in control
counties, but state court jurisdiction significantly reduces this gap. Relative to surrounding counties, per
capita personal income on reservations under state jurisdiction is 7.1 percent higher than on reservations
under tribal courts. Consistent with the capital market benefits of legal enforcement being particularly
important for business activity, proprietor income is more sensitive than overall personal income to court
jurisdiction with a differential of 11.2 percent.
Further, we show the connection between state jurisdiction and reservation incomes works, at least in
part, through the effect legal enforcement has on credit market development. If legal enforcement matters
for real activity via a credit supply channel, the effects of enforcement should be relatively stronger in the
sectors that depend on external capital to fund investment. To evaluate this hypothesis, we build on the
insights of Rajan and Zingales (1998) and test whether state court jurisdiction under PL280 has differential
effects across industries. Using a variety of proxies for an industry’s sensitivity to credit market conditions
– including a novel time-varying measure of external finance dependence based on a principal components
analysis of industry differences in external finance usage, internal finance generation, and investment inten-
sity – we find that state court jurisdiction disproportionately benefits industries with a greater technological
1For example, in a survey of financial services on Native American reservations conducted by the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency, lenders report that obtaining a better understanding of contract enforcement under the tribal legal system would
improve credit conditions on reservations, stating that effective lending requires, “...legal counsel with expertise in Indian law and
who can practice in tribal courts.” (Native American Working Group, 1997).
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demand for external finance and industries with a larger share of firms facing financing constraints. These
cross-sector estimates are robust to reservation-area fixed effects, ruling out a broad class of explanations
related to reservation-area unobservables.
Finally, we attempt to quantify the contribution of law-driven finance to economic growth. We use
the FFIEC data on small business lending to measure credit market activity at the county level, and then rely
on differences in court enforcement from PL280 to predict credit market development across reservations.
Our empirical estimates from this two-stage approach show that law-driven improvements to credit markets
are associated with significant increases in per capita personal and proprietor incomes. Depending on the
estimation approach and sample period, a one standard deviation increase in the predicted level of small
business credit is associated with increases in personal incomes of 12 to 34 percent. Moreover, higher
levels of predicted credit are associated with differentially higher levels of income in sectors that are more
dependent on the supply of external finance. While there are limitations to this approach – namely, there are
other potential mechanisms besides credit supply through which court enforcement can affect income – these
findings suggest a quantitatively important link between the legal component of credit market development
and real economic activity, providing micro-level support for the cross-country evidence in Levine (1998;
1999).
Our paper makes a number of contributions at the intersection of law, finance, and economic growth.
Most notably, there is a long-standing interest in understanding the role institutions play in the process of
economic development (North, 1990; Acemoglu et al., 2001; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005). One potential
mechanism linking the broad institutional environment with economic performance is the development of
the financial sector (King and Levine, 1993; Levine and Zervos, 1998; Levine, 2005), and several prominent
studies find that a country’s legal and judicial environment affects banking behavior and financial market
development (e.g., La Porta et al., 1997, 1998, 2000; Djankov et al., 2002, 2003; Beck et al., 2003; La Porta
et al., 2006; Haselmann et al., 2010). However, as La Porta et al. (2008) discuss, the literature has had more
difficulty establishing a causal link between law-driven changes in financial market outcomes and aggregate
economic performance. In particular, while several cross-national studies find that the financial market
benefits of stronger contract enforcement extend to aggregate economic outcomes (e.g, Levine, 1998, 1999;
Levine et al., 2000), other studies find limited real effects from stronger contracting institutions (Acemoglu
and Johnson, 2005). By combining detailed area-specific data on credit with plausibly exogenous within-
country variation in legal institutions, our work offers stronger evidence than in cross-national studies that
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the financial market consequences of legal enforcement extend to real outcomes.
This paper also adds to a related literature that evaluates the economic consequences of particular
aspects of an economy’s legal infrastructure. For example, some recent studies emphasize the importance of
stronger legal protections of private property for firm performance and economic growth (e.g., Claessens and
Laeven, 2003; Berkowitz et al., 2014), while others focus on the benefits of stronger investor protections for
real activity at the firm level (e.g., Mclean et al., 2012; Brown et al., 2013). Our work turns the attention to a
less-studied aspect of the legal environment: the quality of court enforcement. Research on this topic tends
to focus either on broad evidence of court effectiveness in the cross-national context (e.g., Djankov et al.,
2003, 2008), or relatively clean experimental-type evidence on particular effects of within-country shocks
to the enforcement environment (e.g., Ponticelli, 2013; Gopalan et al., 2014). Our work bridges the gap
between these literatures by documenting broad, economically important real effects of court enforcement
in a quasi-experimental setting.
Our study adds to an emerging empirical literature that exploits natural experiments and new sources
of high quality data on financial market activity to better understand the determinants and consequences of
credit market development (Brown et al., 2013; Vig, 2013; Krishnan et al., 2014). Our findings on small
business credit build upon recent insights using home mortgage and consumer credit data on reservations
(Parker, 2012; Dimitrova-Grajzl et al., 2014), as well as recent work on eligibility for the Community Rein-
vestment Act and the timing of bank evaluations (Agarwal et al., 2012; Munoz and Butcher, 2013), to
provide a more comprehensive picture of the robustness of local credit markets under different legal and
regulatory environments. A better understanding of the regional determinants of credit market development
is particularly important given recent evidence that start-up firms rely extensively on external bank credit
(Robb and Robinson, 2014) and that better access to bank credit spurs small-firm productivity (Krishnan
et al., 2014). Moreover, by linking the exogenous, law-driven variation in credit market outcomes with
long-run economic development, our work speaks to long-standing interest among financial economists in
understanding both the local provision of business credit (e.g., Peterson and Rajan 1994; 1995) and its eco-
nomic effects (Burgess and Pande, 2005; Kerr and Nanda, 2009; Butler and Cornaggia, 2011; Greenstone
and Mas, 2012).
Finally, we contribute to an important literature in economics and finance that studies the long-run ef-
fects of exogenously imposed differences in geography, culture, and legal rules (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Dell,
2010; Michalopoulos, 2012; Glaeser et al., 2014; D’Acunto, 2014). Our work is most directly related to the
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strand of this literature that uses within-country variation to understand the evolution of formal institutions
and the cultural and institutional underpinnings of organizational form, firm behavior, and economic perfor-
mance (Barro and Sala-i Martin, 1992; Bubb, 2013; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2014; Berkowitz et al.,
2014). Although some of this research also exploits institutional arrangements found on Native American
reservations (e.g., Karpoff and Rice 1989; Anderson and Leuck 1992; Cornell and Kalt 2000; Dippel 2014;
Cookson 2014), our analysis is among the first to trace out the micro-level mechanisms through which re-
gional differences in institutions matter for both financial and real economic activity. In particular, our work
suggests that strong local credit markets can explain much of the broad income differences across reserva-
tions with state and tribal courts initially documented by Anderson and Parker (2008), in part by collecting
novel, mid-century banking data specific to reservation areas. As such, our findings and approach should
be as interesting to policymakers concerned about economic development near reservations, as they are to
scholars studying the institutional determinants of cross-national differences in economic performance.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 provides details on institutions and credit pro-
vision on Native American reservations, as context for the empirical analysis. Section 2 describes the data
sources we employ and explains our empirical approach. Section 3 presents our findings on credit. Section
4 presents our findings on aggregate economic activity and how cross-sector real outcomes depend on credit
market development. Section 5 concludes with ideas for future research.
1 Reservation Economies
1.1 Reservation Institutions and Public Law 280
Native American reservations are an ideal setting to study the causal effects of institutions. It is appropriate
to think of reservations as limited sovereign entities, generally not subject to state laws or regulations, but
subordinate to the rule of the U.S. federal government. As a result of a federal policy commitment to
tribal sovereignty, the historical status quo is that each reservation runs its own tribal court to enforce the
law on that reservation.2 In addition, reservations are relatively homogenous on unmeasured dimensions
due to similar culture and long-term exposure to American institutions, a stark contrast to the extensive
heterogeneity in the cross-national setting.
2A series of three Supreme Court cases decided by the Marshall Court, called the Marshall Trilogy (between the years 1823 and
1832), formalized this relationship between the U.S. federal government, U.S. states, and tribes. Congress has used the authority
from the Marshall Trilogy to justify policy interventions on Native American reservations.
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Although reservations have considerable political autonomy, the U.S. Congress passed Public Law
280 in 1953, mandating that a subset of reservations in select states would be subject to jurisdiction by state
courts.3 Legal scholars have suggested that Congress passed PL280 because of a perceived need for stronger
criminal enforcement on reservations. According to a 1953 Senate report on PL280:
“[... T]he enforcement of law and order among the Indians in Indian Country has been left
largely to the Indian groups themselves. In many States, tribes are not adequately organized
to perform that function; consequently, there has been created a hiatus in law enforcement
authority that could best be remedied by conferring criminal jurisdiction on the States indicating
a willingness to accept such responsibility.” (Anderson and Parker, 2014, pg.5)
As an afterthought to extending criminal jurisdiction, state courts were also granted jurisdiction over civil
contract enforcement, “because it comported with the pro-assimilationist drift of federal policy and because
it was convenient and cheap [to add to the law] (Goldberg-Ambrose, 1997, pg. 50).”
Why did Public Law 280 extend to some reservations and not others? PL280 was mandated in six
states: California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, Wisconsin, and Alaska (upon statehood). In addition,
PL280 gave state governments the option to assert PL280 authority after the 1953 law, allowing state courts
to hear disputes on reservations within their borders. Between 1953 and 1968, 10 states asserted optional
PL280 jurisdiction of one form or another, but most of these opt-in assertions of PL280 jurisdiction were
limited in scope – e.g., applying only to pollution laws or jurisdiction over highways (Jimenez and Song,
1998; Getches et al., 1998; Melton and Gardiner, 2006). For our purposes, Florida and Iowa successfully
asserted PL280 jurisdiction over contractual enforcement, and thus, we include reservations in these states
in our measure of state courts. Anderson and Parker (2014) note that an important reason more states did not
assume state jurisdiction under PL280 is that pre-existing disclaimers in many states’ constitutions (which
were established upon statehood) explicitly prohibit jurisdiction in reservation areas. Thus, although court
assignment under PL280 was by no means random, the ultimate geographic pattern of PL280 reservations
arose in large part from a series of historical accidents.4
In all cases where state courts were granted authority on reservations under PL280, the authority
3The law technically allowed for concurrent jurisdiction between state courts and tribal courts, but in effect, the introduction of
state courts to reservations replaced tribal court activity on PL280 reservations.
4Beyond limited scope assertions of PL280, both Montana and North Dakota attempted to assert optional PL280 authority, but
it did not come into force because it conflicted with their state constitutions. In separate legislation (Public Law 785 in 1950),
New York reservations were subjected to the state court system. Because we want our measure to reflect whether state versus tribal
courts have jurisdiction, we include New York reservations under our measure of state court jurisdiction, but exclude reservations in
Montana and North Dakota. In addition, several reservations were exempted from the original law, or had court authority retroceded
to them.
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was granted to state courts without tribal consent. In 1968, Congress passed the Indian Civil Rights Act,
which contained a provision that required states obtain tribal approval before any additional assertions of
PL280 authority. As tribes were unwilling to give up sovereign control of their court systems, there were no
additional assertions of state court authority.5 Consequently, PL280 has resulted in persistent differences in
reservation institutions that were not chosen by the tribes themselves.
To maintain the broadest possible sample for our empirical tests, we classify a reservation as under
tribal courts if state courts cannot hear civil disputes on the reservation either because the reservation’s
state never asserted court jurisdiction over native lands, or because PL280 jurisdiction was exempted or
retroceded as outlined in the 1953 law or in the 1968 amendments to the law in the Indian Civil Rights Act.
Otherwise, a reservation is considered to fall under state court jurisdiction. Although our results are robust
to alternative categorizations of the law, our main approach is consistent with other studies that have used
variation in PL280 civil jurisdiction to study economic outcomes (Anderson and Parker, 2008; Cookson,
2010; Parker, 2012; Cookson, 2014).6
1.2 Law, Credit, and Economic Activity on Reservations
Although PL280’s contract enforcement implications are not why the law was proposed or passed, the
introduction of better-understood state courts to reservations has done much to overcome the unease of
investors who are considering signing debt contracts on reservations (e.g., see Anderson and Parker, 2008).
Within the reservation context, observers have long speculated that problems with credit markets may be
attributable to the nature of contract enforcement on some reservations. There is also an impression that
improvements to credit markets could improve economic performance. Mudd (1972) describes the likely
impacts of two Supreme Court cases involving legal jurisdiction and credit for Montana tribes, and portrays
the Native American credit problem in the following way:
As a practical matter, non-Indian lenders who face the possibility of using tribal courts to en-
force their contracts can be expected to be hesitant in extending credit. The same is true with
5The 1968 Indian Civil Rights Act also allowed for retrocession of PL280 authority, but the process for retrocession of state
court authority to tribal courts is difficult to initiate by tribes. Thus, there were few instances where tribal court authority was
regained. We account for retrocession in our main measure, as well as robustness to alternatives in Appendix Table A.7.
6Our findings are robust to a number of reasonable alternative classifications, which we show in the appendix. Specifically,
we consider classifications that (i) only use variation across mandatory PL280 states and tribal courts, (ii) drop retrocessions and
exemptions from the sample, and (iii) drop observations in Washington, which have some form of state jurisdiction, but in which
the assertion is less clear (Johnson and Paschal, 1992; Anderson and Parker, 2014). Throughout our analysis, we employ Cookson
(2010)’s preferred measure, which retains the broadest sample. For a detailed discussion of important trade-offs in selecting the
appropriate classification of state jurisdiction, see Anderson and Parker (2008) or Cookson (2010).
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Indian lenders who in some cases have an equal reluctance to use tribal court. [...] Another
view is that the present loss of credit, whether created by the confusion as to where jurisdiction
lies, or by lenders’ reluctance to rely on tribal courts, is an unfortunate blow to Indians’ efforts
in economic development and should be remedied.
Moreover, the problem of insufficient credit on reservations persists to this day, with modern policymakers
identifying a similar set of challenges (i.e., insufficient legal infrastructure and inability to pledge tribal land
as collateral). For example, at a 2010 Senate hearing on the question of Native American unemployment on
reservations, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs Donald Laverdure reported that:
The Department of the Treasury conducted a series of workshops, surveys and roundtables to
examine Indian access to capital and financial services. Twenty-four percent of American Indi-
ans interviewed told the government that business loans were “impossible” to obtain. Treasury’s
report estimated that the “investment gap” between American Indian economies and the U.S.
overall totaled $44 billion. The report also found that, despite the fact that 85 percent of finan-
cial institutions on or near Indian lands offer deposit accounts to American Indian residents,
half of those institutions provide only ATMs and personal consumer loans.
The issue of credit on Native American reservations is important unto itself, but, as we argue, a better un-
derstanding of the role of credit markets in supporting economic activity on reservations is also informative
about the linkages between law, finance, and growth more broadly. In this way, our study of the causes
and consequences of credit market outcomes on reservations can speak to settings where it is much more
difficult to measure the causal effects of law and finance.
1.3 Economic Conditions by Court Type Before PL280
Although the historical narrative suggests that assignment to state courts under PL280 was unrelated to credit
markets and development, it is important to verify that initial conditions on reservations with state and tribal
courts are not different in ways that confound any inferences regarding PL280’s long-run impact. Table
1 provides evidence that credit markets, development outcomes, and demographics were broadly similar
across state and tribal court jurisdictions prior to PL280’s passage. Data on outcomes at the reservation-
level around 1953 are scarce, so we focus on the characteristics of the counties in which reservations are
headquartered, an approach we will rely on throughout the paper.
We evaluate credit markets prior to the 1953 law using hand-collected banking data from the 1952
edition of Polk’s Bank Directory (Polks). Polks includes the name of the bank, the location of its headquar-
ters and branches, as well as the bank’s assets and loans. Using county-level measures of banking activity
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(bank assets, bank loans, and total number of branches for banks headquartered in the county), the first
three rows in Panel A of Table 1 show that state and tribal court jurisdictions had similar levels of credit
market development before PL280. Specifically, per capita bank loans were not statistically different under
state courts ($201) versus tribal courts ($192). Bank assets per resident were also similar across jurisdiction
($614 in state and $597 in tribal court counties), as were the number of bank branches per capita in 1952
(0.248 per thousand under state versus 0.313 per thousand under tribal court counties).7
Several other potentially relevant characteristics were also similar across jurisdiction, including initial
levels of economic development and human capital. Notably, median family incomes in 1949 are almost
identical across state and tribal court reservation areas. Additionally, we find similar levels of educational
attainment across jurisdiction as measured by the fraction of population with a high school education (10.8
percent versus 10.4 percent) or college education (2.5 percent versus 2.7 percent). Labor market condi-
tions were also similar, with unemployment rates of 6 percent in both state and tribal court counties, a
figure greater than the 1950 national average of 5.3 percent. Finally, the shares of urban and incarcerated
populations were nearly identical across jurisdiction.
The only notable difference in Table 1 is the population share of non-white individuals (13 percent
of the population under tribal courts versus 6 percent under state courts). On further investigation, this
difference arises entirely from our approach to mapping data to reservations (using counties as a unit of
measurement to overcome the scarcity of reservation-level data, described in Section 2). Specifically, there
is no difference in non-white share across state and tribal jurisdiction for Census tracts that are primarily
on reservation land (see Appendix Table A.1, which uses GIS and information from the 2000 Census).
There is also no difference in present day incomes under state and tribal courts in Census tracts that do
not contain reservation land, but are nonetheless in the reservation’s county. Consequently, including land
area that is beyond the reservation boundary likely attenuates differences between state court and tribal
court jurisdictions when measured at the county level. Although the non-white share difference in 1950 is
concerning at first glance, this evidence gives us confidence that comparing long-run outcomes under state
and tribal courts is useful for causal inference.
7Other research has also found that reservation areas have similar conditions across legal jurisdiction prior to PL280. For
instance, the more aggregate evidence in Parker (2012, Table 2) also supports the conclusion that regions targeted by PL280 did
not differ dramatically with respect to initial credit market conditions. He finds that total lending from customary (mostly private)
lenders in the 1951-1952 period was marginally weaker in Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) regions that were predominantly assigned
state courts under PL280.
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2 Data and Measurement
2.1 Using County Data to Study Reservation Outcomes
We map reservations to U.S. counties because there are no detailed sector-level data for economic outcomes
on reservations, nor are there good measures of business credit available at the reservation level (e.g., see
Todd, 2012). To link the county-level data to the reservation, we match the location of the reservation’s head-
quarters to its county, using Tiller’s Guide to Indian Country (Tiller, 1996). The reservation’s headquarters
is useful for this purpose, because most economic activity on the reservation occurs near its headquarters.
We then link the reservation’s headquarters county to counties that are directly adjacent, as well as those
counties that are nearby (within 20 miles) using Collard-Wexler (2014). Because they share common geo-
graphic attributes and shocks, but do not share the same institutional environment, these nearby and adjacent
counties are a natural control group for use in our specifications.
Although most reservations map well to county land area, Figure 1 illustrates two of the most extreme
examples of the imprecision of this exercise. In the first example, the Lake Traverse Reservation (South
Dakota-North Dakota) has land in seven counties. However, most of the reservation land is in Roberts
County, with very little land in any of the surrounding six counties (furthermore, almost all of Roberts
County is on the reservation). In the second example, the Hoopa Valley Reservation (California) is wholly
contained within Humboldt County, but does not represent a large portion of the county’s land. Although
most reservations in our sample are about the size of a county, we address the imprecision of the reservation-
county mapping by controlling for geographic attributes of the reservation or including reservation fixed
effects.
Overall, our sample includes 105 reservation counties, 27 of which have state legal jurisdiction and 78
use tribal courts. Figure (2) presents the geography of these reservation counties across the U.S. Reservations
under PL280 status are noticeably scattered across regions of the United States.
2.2 Data sources
2.2.1 Credit Market Data
We employ a variety of different data sets to describe credit market conditions on reservations. We use
data from multiple complementary sources because each credit data set that can be mapped to reservation
10
counties has distinct advantages and disadvantages. Also, even when the data has geographic variation, it is
often limited in scope to certain types of borrowers or lenders.
Our primary measure of credit provision is the dollar value of lending to small businesses, which is
provided by the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) in accordance with the Com-
munity Reinvestment Act (CRA). The data are aggregated at the county level and includes loans issued to
businesses with less than $1 million in annual revenues, originating from banks that exceed a specified asset
threshold.8 Greenstone and Mas (2012) compare the FFIEC data with with FDIC call reports and show that
the FFIEC data captures approximately 86 percent of small business loans.
One shortcoming of the FFIEC’s small business data is that, in the presence of credit frictions, busi-
ness owners could seek alternative sources of funding that are outside the FFIEC’s regulatory reach. As such,
we supplement the analysis with consumer credit data from the FRBNY Consumer Credit Panel (FRBNY -
CCP). This longitudinal data set tracks household liabilities and repayment using a five percent randomized
sample of individuals with a social security number and a credit report on file at the Equifax credit reporting
agency.9 The data provide a comprehensive picture of reservation-area consumer credit (Dimitrova-Grajzl
et al., 2014), and there is a strong link between business and consumer credit outcomes according to prior
research that employs the FRBNY - CCP data (Munoz and Butcher, 2013). Specifically, we use the average
consumer riskscore in the county, because it reflects a history of borrowing and repayment, and it is a na-
tionally standardized metric on a scale of 300 to 850. Moreover, all individuals in the FRBNY - CCP data
have a riskscore.
A second limitation of the FFIEC data is that its scope is confined to the lending activity of large
banks. For this reason, we provide complementary tests using information from the FDIC Summary of
Deposits on the branching activity of community banks that do not meet the threshold for reporting under
the CRA. Our measure is the number of full service and retail bank branches, segmented by the bank’s total
assets.
Throughout the analysis, we collapse each of these data sources to the average of their 1997 to 2003
county-level values (1999-2003 for the FRBNY - CCP data, which start in 1999). We confine the modern-
day credit data to these years in order to make the results comparable across data sets. However, in the
8The asset threshold was $250 million before 2005. In 2007 the threshold rose to $1.033 billion and has since been adjusted
annually using the CPI.
9Technically, the sample is randomized by using five pairs of arbitrarily selected digits at the end of an individual’s social
security number. Moreover, most of the U.S. population has a credit report, and Brown et al. (2013) provides a favorable view of
comparisons between the Equifax data and other nationally representative surveys.
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appendix, we show that our findings are robust to using the complete range of these data sets in panel-form
with yearly fixed effects.
2.2.2 Other Data Sources
In our analysis of economic activity, we employ data from the Regional Economic Information System
(REIS, Table CA05), produced by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The data include personal
income, earnings, and population by county and BEA sector annually from 1969 to 2000.10 The fact that
these data are local, sector-specific, and annual is ideal for studying the effects of courts and credit on
economic activity.
The definition of personal income is broader than earnings because it also includes proprietor income,
income derived from farming, interest and dividends, as well as transfers. Within the earnings component
of personal income, the REIS data also breaks down earnings by BEA sector, an industry measure that cor-
responds closely to one-digit SIC industries but is more refined in some instances (e.g., retail and wholesale
belong to the same one-digit SIC industry but are included in separate BEA sectors).
When analyzing sector-specific measures of income, we focus on sectors for which there is ample
economic activity on reservations and their nearby areas. For this reason, we restrict attention to sectors that
have a median personal income across all sample years and counties of greater than $5,000. The sectors
that remain in our sample – manufacturing, transportation, construction, retail, and services – comprise
the majority of personal income on reservations. Moreover, there is significant variation across these BEA
sectors in the degree to which financing is important for business operations (e.g., firms in the retail sector
use considerably less external finance and generate more internal finance than firms in the manufacturing
and services sectors). In our analysis of sector income and dependence on external finance, we explicitly
use within-reservation variation in personal earnings across BEA sectors to quantify how the provision of
credit and legal enforcement matter for economic activity.
In addition to these main measures, we also use data on other aspects of reservations, such as reserva-
tion acreage and headquarters locations, from Anderson and Parker (2008) and Cookson (2010). Together
with our main measures of credit and income, Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for all the key variables
we use in the empirical tests.
10Similar county-sector-year-level data are available from 2001 to present day, but the industry classification changed from SIC
industries to NAICS industries. Moreover, the matching between SIC-defined industries and NAICS-defined industries is imperfect,
and we avoid having to implement this SIC-NAICS crosswalk by focusing on the SIC-only sample.
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2.3 Empirical Framework
Given that economic and credit market conditions were similar in state and tribal court counties prior to
PL280, the raw difference in current outcomes between state and tribal courts is informative of court en-
forcement’s effect on credit markets and development. However, an important econometric challenge is
that broad economic regions (that include reservations) could experience different development trajectories
for reasons spuriously correlated to court assignment under PL280. To account for possible region-specific
differences in development unrelated to court enforcement, we also evaluate the effect of state courts on
reservation outcomes against the benchmark provided by nearby counties (e.g. Ellison and Glaeser, 1997).
Specifically, we estimate PL280’s influence on the gap between reservation outcomes and outcomes
in the nearby region using the following spatial difference-in-differences model:
Yi = γs +β1resvni +β2statecourti +β3resvni× statecourti + γXi + εi. (1)
In equation (1), Yi measures credit market or other economic outcomes for each county i within 20 miles
of a reservation’s headquarters. In addition to our focus on resvni and statecourti and their interaction,
the model includes state fixed effects (γs) and a vector (Xi) that contains geographic-area and county-level
controls. All of our main specifications control for the size of the reservation in acres and the reservation
county’s population, but in more detailed specifications, we also include the number of counties in which
the reservation has land, and in our most stringent specifications, reservation area fixed effects.
The pair of maps in Figure 1 help explain the identification approach employed in equation (1).
Hoopa Valley Reservation falls under state court jurisdiction (statecourti = 1) while Lake Traverse Reser-
vation does not (statecourti = 0). Surrounding counties that are within 20 miles of Hoopa Valley’s (Lake
Traverse) headquarters are also coded as statecourti = 1 (statecourti = 0). Meanwhile, resvni equals one
for both Hoopa Valley and Lake Traverse’s headquarters county. The counties that surround the reservation
headquarters counties are coded resvni = 0.
To interpret equation (1), we are primarily interested in the difference-in-difference coefficient β3,
because it measures how state court jurisdiction affects the gap between reservation and off-reservation
outcomes. In the context of our example reservations, β3 measures the size of the gap between Hoopa
Valley and its control counties relative to the size of the gap between Lake Traverse and its control counties.
The other coefficients have useful interpretations as well: β1 reflects the gap between reservation outcomes
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and off-reservation outcomes under the status quo (tribal courts), while β2 reflects how regions targeted by
PL280 differ from regions that were not targeted by PL280.
3 Do Courts Affect Credit Markets?
3.1 Legal Jurisdiction and Reservation Credit Markets
We start by exploring the link between state court jurisdiction and credit markets on reservations. Follow-
ing the empirical approach discussed above, the following linear model estimates the effect of state legal
jurisdiction on credit market development:
crediti = γs +β1resvni +β2statecourt i +β3resvni× statecourt i + γXi + εi. (2)
The dependent variable, crediti, is either the logged average dollar value of small business loans per capita
(log(bus.crediti)) or the average Equifax risk score of consumers (riskscorei) in county i between 1997 and
2003. To focus our analysis on persistent differences in credit outcomes, we aggregate loan values from
the FFIEC business credit data and Equifax risk scores to the county i level, and the estimation includes all
counties located within a 20-mile radius of the reservation’s headquarters county. In the richest specification,
the vector Xi contains logged county population, size of the reservation in acres, an indicator for whether
the reservation has land in more than two counties, and the interaction between between the multiple county
indicator and reservation status. As an alternative approach to controlling for geographic and demographic
considerations, and unobservable factors more generally, the following results are robust to reservation-area
fixed effects (reported in Appendix Table A.3). To re-emphasize our interpretation of the model, the coef-
ficient β3 on the interaction between statecourti and resvni captures the impact of state courts on the credit
market outcomes relative to the credit market activity in nearby counties. Moreover, we estimate the model
using OLS with standard errors allowing for clustering by reservation region (a reservation headquarters
county and its associated control counties).
Panel 1 in Table 3 presents evidence on small business lending. Before estimating equation (2), we
report the estimated effect of state courts on log(bus.crediti) in sub-samples of reservation-headquarters
counties and adjacent counties. The coefficient estimate on statecourti from the reservation sub-sample is
0.363 (s.e.= 0.171), indicating that small business lending is approximately 40 percent larger in reservations
14
under state courts than in reservations under tribal courts.11
Columns 1 through 4 present estimates of the spatial difference-in-difference equation (2) with log(bus.crediti)
as the dependent variable. Regardless of whether the specification includes reservation-area controls (pop-
ulation and reservation acreage), state fixed effects, and multi-county controls (an indicator for more than
two counties with reservation land and an interaction with resvni), the difference-in-difference effect of state
jurisdiction is large and statistically significant, with an effect size ranging from 0.35 to 0.44 log-points of
business credit. These estimates indicate that business credit is 41.1 percent to 55.3 percent greater under
state courts than under tribal courts, holding constant the comparison to adjacent counties.
The coefficient estimates on the uninteracted reservation and state jurisdiction dummy variables are
also reasonable. The coefficient on the resvni dummy variable is significantly negative in each specifica-
tion, indicative of a sizable reservation credit gap: reservations tend to have less small business lending
than adjacent counties. Consistent with the reservation and adjacent sample splits, the coefficient on the
statecourti dummy variable is small and statistically insignificant, showing that credit market activity is
similar in counties adjacent to reservations with state courts compared to counties adjacent to reservations
with tribal courts. The latter finding supports our view that the passage of PL280 was not targeted toward
broad regions that experienced more rapid credit market development. Together, the results highlight the rel-
ative underdevelopment of credit markets on reservations, and show that state court jurisdiction significantly
reduces this gap.
Panel 2 uses our county-level measure of consumer credit (creditscorei) as a dependent variable. As
in Panel 1, the coefficient estimate on statecourti in the reservation sub-sample is positive and statistically
significant, indicating that consumer credit markets are stronger under state courts. This conclusion sur-
vives our more stringent spatial difference-in-difference specifications, as the estimate for β3 (the coefficient
on the difference-in-difference term resvni × statecourti) is also positive and statistically significant across
specifications. The estimate for β3 is approximately 13 credit score points in all specifications, regardless of
whether we include reservation-area controls (columns 1 and 2), or add state fixed effects (columns 3 and
4) and an indicator for the reservation crossing multiple counties (column 4). To interpret the magnitude of
the effect, it is approximately 80 percent of the coefficient size on resvni (approximately 17 points), indicat-
ing that state courts alleviate a substantial portion of the reservation credit gap. Another way to assess the




− 1, when using a logged dependent
variable.
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economic significance is to note that 13 points on a credit score is approximately a one standard deviation
increase in state-level average credit scores across the United States. We note that the statecourti coefficient
is also positive and significant in the adjacent sub-sample regression, as well as in columns 1 and 2, indicat-
ing slightly higher consumer credit scores in areas surrounding reservations with state courts. However, the
statecourti coefficient estimate becomes close to zero upon including state fixed effects (columns 3 and 4),
while the reservation credit-gap estimates are completely unchanged.
3.2 Legal Jurisdiction and Banking Activity
As a robustness check on the main measures of credit market activity, we exploit the fact that the FFIEC
data also reports lending activity at the bank-county-year level. This feature of the data allows us to exploit
within-bank variation and to evaluate how court jurisdiction affects bank-lending decisions at both the ex-
tensive and intensive margins. In particular, does tribal court jurisdiction completely constrain the bank from
providing small business loans to reservations, or does most of the aggregated effect arise from originating
fewer, smaller loans under tribal courts?
We estimate the difference-in-difference specifications with bank-level fixed effects (γb):
bankingib = γb +β1resvni +β2statecourti +β3resvni× statecourti + γXi + εib. (3)
Each observation in equation (3) is a bank-county pair for the set of banks that were observed in the FFIEC
data every year from 1997 to 2003. The dependent variable bankingib is either an indicator for whether bank
b lends a positive amount to county i, or is the logarithm of one plus the average amount of lending (per
capita loans to small businesses with revenues less than $1 million) bank b originates to county i between
1997 and 2003. The vector Xi contains logged county population and the size of the reservation in acres.
Panel 1 of Table 4 presents estimates of equation (3) showing that the lending decisions of banks
are affected along both margins. Notably, the estimates in columns 1 through 3 show that banks are 1.1
percentage points more likely (average propensity to lend is 1.8 percentage points) to originate loans on
reservations under state courts than under tribal courts, after benchmarking against lending activity in nearby
regions. Further, the regression estimates in columns 4 through 6 indicate that the intensive margin matters
as well: conditional on lending to the reservation, banks extend approximately 6 percent more small business
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loans to reservations under state courts than under tribal courts.12
Even for the tests that rely purely on within-bank variation, the primary limitation of the small busi-
ness credit data analyzed in equation (2) is that the CRA only requires large banks (>$250 million in assets
for years 1997 through 2003) to report small business lending. This reporting threshold is potentially prob-
lematic for our analysis of credit provision if state jurisdiction has stronger effects on the decisions of large
banks. In particular, it is possible that reduced lending by large banks to areas under tribal courts is at least
partially offset by increased lending activity by local community banks.13 To mitigate this concern, we now
analyze how state jurisdiction affects the branching decisions of smaller community banks.
We supplement our analysis of small business lending by estimating the effect of state jurisdiction on
the branching decisions of community banks with the following difference-in-difference specification:
log(1+branches.popi) = γs +β1resvni +β2statecourt i +β3resvni× statecourti + γXi + εi (4)
Using data provided by the FDIC Summary of Deposits, the outcome variable, branches.popi, is the number
of bank branches in county i (averaged across the years 1997 - 2003) per 10,000 county residents. As in our
business credit specifications (equation (2)), each observation is a county i within 20 miles (and inclusive) of
the reservation’s headquarters county, and the coefficient of interest, β3, reflects the difference-in-difference
effect of state court jurisdiction on the extent of community banking activity.
Panel 2 of Table 4 presents estimates from several specifications of equation (4). The results indicate a
strong and statistically significant effect of state jurisdiction on branching density, regardless of whether we
include all banks (column 1), restrict the count of bank branches to community banks with less than $250M
in assets (column 2), or focus only on the smallest community banks (<$100M in assets). As in the business
credit specifications, the main effect on resvni is negative, showing that reservations tend to have worse
financial development (fewer banks per capita of all types) than their adjacent county regions. Our estimates
imply that reservations under tribal courts have approximately 20 percent fewer branches per capita than
their adjacent regions, but the reservations under state courts have similar bank branching density relative
12In the appendix (Table A.6), we estimate these effects with Tobit regressions to account for the fact that a large number of
the bank-county loan amounts are equal to zero (i.e., the typical bank only makes loans to a small fraction of the counties in our
sample).
13In unreported regressions, we find that larger banks have a relatively greater presence under state courts relative to tribal courts.
This pattern is plausible, especially if local community banks are better equipped than large banks to overcome imperfect local
contracting environments using local knowledge of soft information.
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to nearby counties. That is, the estimates in Panel 2 suggest that the effect of state jurisdiction completely
offsets the gap in reservation banking activity.
The results in Table 4 also imply that our findings from the small business credit data are not driven
by composition effects within the banking industry. Credit market outcomes improve across the board under
state jurisdiction. In particular, state jurisdiction promotes greater branching activity by smaller community
banks while at the same time promoting lending by larger banks that meet the CRA reporting threshold.
Apart from providing deeper evidence on the positive link between contract enforcement and credit market
development, this set of findings supports our use of the small business credit data to measure credit market
outcomes across reservations.
4 Do Law and Finance Affect Economic Activity?
4.1 Legal Jurisdiction and Overall Income Levels
Anderson and Parker (2008) provide evidence that reservations under state court jurisdiction have higher
income growth from 1969 onward. Table 5 updates their findings, and extends the analysis to consider
proprietor incomes as well. Using our sub-sample of reservation counties indicated in the columns labeled
reservation, we estimate that state courts increase reservation personal incomes by 11 percent, with a no-
ticeably larger effect on proprietor incomes (approximately 18 percent). Moreover, the incomes in areas
surrounding the reservation are no different under state or tribal courts (columns labeled adjacent).
The results withstand our more stringent spatial difference-in-differences empirical strategy.14 The
specification is the same as in earlier tests,
log(inc.percapit) = γs + γt +β1resvni +β2statecourti +β3resvni× statecourti + γXi + εit , (5)
except the dependent variable is now the logarithm of income per capita, log(inc.percapit), and year fixed
effects (γt) account for the panel nature of the BEA income data (1969 to 2000). We present estimates of
equation (5) both for the full range of BEA data (columns 1 and 3) and, to offer a comparison to Section
14In Appendix Table A.2, we also demonstrate this finding using geographically-precise measures based on Census tracts mapped
to reservation land. The income differences between state and tribal courts are only present in the Census tracts with the most
significant overlap with the reservation.
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3.1’s tests of PL280 on credit, for the year-2000 sample (columns 2 and 4).
In column 1, the difference-in-difference effect of state jurisdiction on per capita personal income is
statistically significant at the one percent level, clustering the standard errors by reservation region. The
magnitudes of the estimates are large as well, implying that state jurisdiction has an effect of 7.1 percent
on per capita personal income. Comparing this effect to the resvni coefficient estimate (β1 = −0.107),
state jurisdiction overcomes around 70 percent of the income gap between reservations and their adjacent
counties. Although the estimated difference-in-difference coefficient for personal income is marginally
insignificant when we use only observations from the year 2000, the magnitude is similar at 5.8 percent of
per capita personal income.
State legal jurisdiction has larger effects on proprietor incomes (columns 3 and 4). Specifically, the
estimate of β3 is 11.2 percent of per capita proprietor income in the full sample, and even greater (14.4
percent) on the sample confined to year-2000 data, both of which are statistically significant at the 5 percent
level or better. Because proprietor incomes are presumably more directly linked to credit market conditions,
these results suggest that credit plays an important role in fostering income growth. We now expand our
inquiry into the law-finance-growth channel using a more systematic approach.
4.2 Legal Jurisdiction, External Financial Dependence, and Sector Income
In this section, we evaluate whether the expansion of credit under state courts has led to better economic
conditions. To evaluate this finance-growth link, we employ an identification strategy in the spirit of Rajan
and Zingales (1998) that utilizes within-reservation variation in incomes across sectors. If state courts
promote long-run economic development through a credit channel, then the increases in income under state
courts will be stronger in sectors that rely more on external finance. Our cross-sector tests employ several
alternative proxies for an industry’s sensitivity to the external credit environment, which we describe below.
4.2.1 Measures of Sensitivity to Financial Markets
Our first time-varying measure of industry financial dependence, ext f in jt , is equal to the median firm’s ratio
of total external financing (net stock and long-term debt issues) to total assets for the past five years. The
measure is constructed using a sample of young (in Compustat for less than 15 years), publicly traded U.S.
firms that have nonmissing total assets at any point between 1971 and 2000 (company statement of cash
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flows on external financing is not widely available until 1971). We compute ext f in jt from 1975 to 2000,
because ext f in jt requires four years of data prior to the measurement year.
We also build a second, arguably more comprehensive measure of financial dependence, which in-
corporates the industry’s internal cash flow (c f jt) and fixed investment intensity (capx jt) alongside external
finance usage (ext f in jt). We construct a single index by extracting the first principal component of these
variables. The first principal component loads on factors that determine dependence on external finance,
with an equation given by:
external.depend jt = 0.773× ext f in jt +0.533× capx jt −0.346× c f jt .
According to this measure, dependence on external finance is greater when the use of external funds is high,
investment intensity is high, and cash flow is low.15
A potential concern with these external dependence measures, particularly when applied to the reser-
vation setting, is that they are based solely on the financing activities of large, publicly traded firms. As
Rajan and Zingales (1998) note when discussing similar concerns in the cross-national context (see p. 563-
564), because U.S. public firms presumably face the least supply-side financing frictions, their financing
activities best reflect the sector’s technological demand for external finance. Nonetheless, we also consider
other characteristics that should affect how sensitive an industry’s performance is to credit market develop-
ment, yet map better to the typical firm located on and around reservations. Specifically, we focus on the
degree to which industries are composed of young and small firms. There are several reasons to expect that
young and small firms face more severe financial constraints, suggesting sectors with relatively more young
and small firms will benefit most from stronger local credit markets. In addition, a measure that exploits
variation in the age and size of public firms across sectors is arguably more robust to differences between
public and private firms than measures based on the external financing activities of publicly listed firms.
Hadlock and Pierce (2010) show that an index based only on firm size and age (the SA index) is a
reliable predictor of firm-level financing constraints.16 Following Hadlock and Pierce (2010), we classify
15When we calculate the PCA, the first two principal components capture over 90 percent of variation, and they appear to
capture distinct effects. The second principal component appears to indicate a tendency of firms to finance investment internally
internal.invest jt = −0.158× ext f inta + 0.688× capxta + 0.708× c fta.We report results using the second principal component in
Table A.11 in the appendix.
16Using the coefficients from an ordered logit, Hadlock and Pierce (2010) construct the SA index equal to: SA =−0.737×size+
0.043× size2−0.040×age. Size is the (deflated) log of total assets (in millions of $), and age is the number of years since the firm
first appears in Compustat with a non-missing stock price.
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firms with an SA index in the top tercile across all firms in a given year to be financially constrained. The
measure, f rac.constrained, is the share of total firms in each industry and year that fall into the constrained
category. For robustness, we construct proxies for the importance of financing constraints using the median
SA index and the median firm size in each industry and year.
4.2.2 Tests of External Finance Dependence on Sector Incomes
Using sector-specific income measures from the BEA from 1975 to 2000, we estimate the effect of state
jurisdiction across sectors with the specification:
log(sector.inci jt) = γi + γ jt +β1statecourti× ext f in jt + εi jt , (6)
where the dependent variable is per capita income in sector j observed for each reservation county i and
year t. We restrict the sample in these tests to reservation counties because we can identify the differential
effect of state courts from within-county variation in incomes across sectors. As before, statecourti = 1
indicates that the reservation in county i is subject to PL280 state jurisdiction. The independent variable,
ext f in jt , is a measure of external finance dependence. The baseline specification includes reservation county
(γi) and sector-year (γ jt) fixed effects. Reservation fixed effects account for any time-invariant reservation
characteristics that we explicitly control for in other specifications (i.e., reservation size and indicators for
reservation land in multiple counties). A positive estimate for our coefficient of interest, β1, implies that
income differences across sectors with high and low ext f in jt are larger under state courts than under tribal
courts.
Column 1 of Table 6 reports the results from estimating equation (6) using our primary measure of
external finance dependence, ext f in jt . The estimated coefficient on the interaction statecourti × ext f in jt
is positive and highly significant (β1 = 0.040, s.e. = 0.011), consistent with state jurisdiction promoting
economic activity through credit provision to finance-dependent industries. The economic magnitudes are
striking. The estimate of equation 6 implies that the difference in incomes between a sector with high
external finance dependence (one standard deviation above the mean) and a sector with average external
finance dependence is 4 percent larger on reservations with state courts compared to reservations with tribal
courts. We quantify the magnitude of this 4 percent effect by noting that it compares favorably in percentage
terms to the effect of state courts on aggregate per capita income (7.1 percent, see Table 5). That the cross-
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sector effects are on the same order of magnitude as the aggregate effects suggests that the financing channel
highlighted in the cross-sector analysis is an important factor behind the overall difference in incomes across
state and tribal jurisdiction. Furthermore, our PCA-based index of external finance dependence leads to
similar findings (column 2, β1 = 0.031, s.e.= 0.010).
In columns 3 and 4, we include the interaction between state jurisdiction and the share of firms in
an industry that Hadlock and Pierce’s SA index classifies as constrained. In each case, β1 is positive and
statistically significant, indicating that state jurisdiction has a stronger effect on income in sectors that have
more constrained firms. The magnitude of the cross-sector effects using the financial constraints measure,
f rac.constranied, is even stronger than the corresponding cross-sector effects we observe using external
finance dependence. Moreover, in columns 5 and 6 we use median firm size in the industry in place of
fraction constrained. The coefficient estimates on the interaction between state court jurisdiction and firm
size are approximately -0.05, and are statistically significant at the one percent level. The estimates show
that the effect of state jurisdiction is more pronounced in sectors where the typical firm is smaller. Finally,
external finance dependence and firm financing constraints have distinct effects on income. Columns 4
and 6 include statecourti × ext f in jt as an independent variable alongside the interaction between financial
constraints and state courts. In addition to retaining statistical significance, the estimates of statecourti ×
ext f in jt have magnitudes similar to those in columns 1 and 2.
Appendix Tables A.9, A.10, and A.11 report a number of alternative approaches for estimating the
within-reservation, across industry effects of state court jurisdiction. In each case, the results show that
state jurisdiction has a positive and relatively stronger effect on incomes in the sectors that should be most
sensitive to the availability of credit. These cross-sector patterns rule out most other potential mechanisms
through which stronger enforcement under PL280 leads to stronger income growth.
4.3 Predicted Credit and Overall Income
We now attempt to quantify the importance of the post-PL280 credit expansion for economic development
on reservations. To do so, we project our measures of income onto the law-driven component of credit using
a two-stage least squares procedure that exploits the exogenous variation in court enforcement arising from
PL280. To the extent that credit expansion is the primary mechanism linking stronger courts with economic
development, as our cross-sector tests suggest, this IV-approach provides useful estimates of the quantitative
importance of credit expansion for long-run incomes. Although we are reluctant to draw causal inferences
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from this exercise because other non-financial channels correlated with law-driven financing cannot be ruled
out, the exercise has the potential to bring us closer to revealing the depths of credit’s impact on economic
activity.
Table 7 estimates the effect of reservation-area credit market activity on aggregate and sector-specific
reservation incomes. The regression specifications and data samples are nearly identical to equations (5) and
(6), respectively. When we use OLS, we replace the independent variable statecourti with log(resvn.credit i),
the log of the average dollar value of small business loans per capita for loans made in the reservation
headquarters county between 1997 and 2003. Likewise, the IV estimates use statecourti to instrument for
log(resvn.credit i) in a two-stage least squares procedure. We normalize log(resvn.crediti) so that a one
unit increase is equal to a standard deviation increase in credit.
Panel 1 presents the results from estimating a specification that mirrors equation (5).17 In column
1, the OLS estimate of the coefficient on log(resvn.credit i) is 0.122 (s.e. = 0.037). In column 2, the IV
estimate is 0.341 (s.e. = 0.042). Accordingly, a standard deviation increase in business credit is associated
with a 12 to 34 percent increase in personal incomes. Columns 3 and 4 estimate the effect of credit on
proprietor incomes. As expected, per capita proprietor income is particularly sensitive to the robustness of
credit markets. The OLS and IV coefficients are 0.184 (s.e.= 0.033) and 0.458 (s.e.= 0.068).
Panel 2 mirrors the within-reservation tests in equation (6).18 Credit is more strongly related to income
in sectors with high external finance dependence. In regressions with personal incomes as the dependent
variable (columns 1 and 2), the OLS coefficient on ext f in× log(resvn.credit i) is 0.025 (s.e.= 0.010) and the
IV estimate is 0.100 (s.e. = 0.014). The coefficient estimates are similar when we also include reservation
county fixed effects (columns 3 and 4). Broadly, the insensitivity of our coefficient magnitudes to richer
fixed effects suggests that omitted variable bias is not likely a problem (e.g., see Oster, 2014). Moreover,
these specifications rule out a wide variety of alternative credit-related mechanisms (i.e., those that plausibly
vary at the reservation level, such as the ability to make credible commitments). Because these estimates
rely on externally imposed variation in legal enforcement, control for reservation-specific unobservables
with reservation fixed effects, and exploit differences across industries in exposure to credit, we consider
17Because credit shows up in two terms in our spatial difference-in-difference regression specifications, we technically have
two endogenous regressors (log(resvn_crediti) and resvni × log(resvn_crediti). As is standard practice, we use statecourti and
resvni × statecourti to instrument for log(resvn.crediti) and resvni × log(resvn.crediti), and perform the estimation using two-
stage least squares.
18The IV regressions use statecourt and statecourt × ext f in as instruments for the variables log(resvn.credit i) and
log(resvn.credit i)× ext f in.
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this finding to strongly support the conjecture that legal enforcement promotes economic growth through a
finance mechanism.
5 Conclusion
In 1953, the U.S. Congress assigned state courts to enforce contract disputes on a subset of Native American
reservations. Given that Native American reservations within the United States are relatively similar on
other institutional and cultural dimensions, this setting offers a unique opportunity to evaluate how exter-
nally imposed differences in legal institutions affect credit markets and economic activity. Using detailed
sector- and location-specific data on credit and income, we document a strong, persistent link between court
enforcement and the extent of financial and economic development on reservations. Indeed, the economic
magnitude of the effect of court enforcement (7 percent of per capita income) is remarkable given the overall
strength of the U.S. financial sector and the long-standing academic notions that finance finds opportunity
and weak contracting institutions have only limited economic effects (e.g., Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005).
There is still much to learn from the differential assignment of legal institutions across Native Amer-
ican reservations. For example, we link the strength of court enforcement and development of local credit
markets with income levels in finance-dependent sectors because this analysis is a logical starting point for
understanding how law and finance promote growth more broadly. In a similar vein, future work might
extend our approach to study how access to credit affects new firm creation, entrepreneurial activity, em-
ployment, and productivity growth, particularly in finance-dependent sectors. In addition, given small-firm
reliance on bank credit (e.g., Robb and Robinson, 2014) and the importance of small business enterprises for
reservation-area employment and income, the reservation setting is well-suited to evaluate how household-
level collateral constraints and financial health influence the creation and growth of new enterprises (e.g.,
Hurst and Lusardi, 2004; Adelino et al., 2013).
We exploit variation that arises from sharp historical differences between state courts and tribal courts
on reservations, but this paper’s lessons undoubtedly apply broadly. Namely, our work suggests that im-
proved court effectiveness can be a particularly important facilitator of growth in settings where legal in-
stitutions are relatively weak. Moreover, the quantitative importance of the effects we document suggests
that the courts may continue to influence economic performance even in settings, such as across U.S. states,
where the institutional variation is less pronounced. For example, state legal systems differ with respect to
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how much judicial independence is afforded to the appointment and retention of judges (Hanssen, 2004),
and these differences lead to notable variation in court outcomes (e.g., tort awards studied in Tabarrok and
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Table 1: Reservation Economies Prior to Public Law 280’s 1953 passage
Note: This table presents statistics from prior to the passage of the 1953 law, Public Law 280, which gave state courts authority to adjudicate
contracts on a subset of Native American reservations. All observations are at the county-level. We classify a county as state (tribal) court if Public
Law 280 applies (does not apply) to the reservation that has a headquarters in the county. All data come from the 1950 U.S. Census, except for
bank branches, bank loans, and bank assets, which come from the 1952 edition of Polk’s Bank Directory. The data from Polk’s is a county-level
aggregate of loans, assets, or branches for banks that are headquartered in that county. These variables are converted to per capita using the county’s
population according to the 1950 Census. The family incomes measure is the county’s median income expressed in terms of income buckets running
from zero (lowest income range) to nine (highest). Statistical significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively.
Credit and Incomes
State Courts Tribal Courts Difference p-value
bank branches per capita (×1000) 0.0248 0.0313 -0.0065 0.579
bank loans per capita 201.1 191.8 9.29 0.909
bank assets per capita 614.2 596.7 17.51 0.942
family incomes 5.85 5.81 0.04 0.887
Economic Conditions and Demographics
State Courts Tribal Courts Difference p-value
non-white population (% pop.) 0.0582 0.132 -0.074 0.001***
high school educated (% pop.) 0.108 0.104 0.0047 0.535
college educated (% pop.) 0.0245 0.0270 -0.0026 0.283
unemployment rate 0.0596 0.0601 -0.00053 0.948
fraction urban 0.299 0.301 -0.0011 0.987
fraction incarcerated (×100) 0.583 0.666 -0.083 0.690
N 27 75
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
Note: This table presents summary statistics of variables we analyze throughout the paper. The data comes from the following sources: (1) the
Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC), (2) the FRBNY Consumer Credit Panel (FRBNY - CCP), (3) the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA) Regional Economic Information System (Table CA05), (4) the rest of the reservation-level measures were taken from the 1990 and
2000 U.S. Census and Tiller’s Guide to Indian Country as coded in Anderson and Parker (2008), and (5) Compustat. The sample includes counties
that contain a reservations headquarters and counties within 20 miles according to Collard-Wexler (2014). State Jurisdiction Indicator is equal to
one if the reservation in the county uses the state’s court system under the authority of Public Law 280 and zero if the reservation uses tribal courts.
Reservation and Adjacent County Samples
Mean Median Std Dev 5th %ile 95th %ile Level
Outcome Variables
Logged Small Business Lending ($ Per Capita, 1997-2003 Avg.) 5.449 5.472 0.813 4.056 6.602 County
Credit Score (Reservation Average, 1999-2003 Avg.) 690.1 694.6 23.17 596.4 741.7 County
Logged Income ($ Per Capita) ... Panel (Years 1969-2000) 9.200 9.310 0.625 8.090 10.059 Year-County
... Cross-Section (Year 2000) 10.03 10.04 0.178 9.722 10.302 County
Logged Proprietor Income ($ Per Capita) ... Panel (Years 1969-2000) 0.827 0.765 0.395 0.312 1.584 Year-County
... Cross-Section (Year 2000) 1.212 1.165 0.411 0.644 1.966 County
Explanatory Variables
State Jurisdiction Indicator 0.231 - 0.422 - - Reservation
Reservation Headquarters Indicator 0.190 - 0.393 - - County
Area and Multiple County Controls
Logged Population ... Panel (Years 1969-2000) 9.906 9.804 1.390 7.790 12.423 Year-County
... Cross-Section (Year 2000) 10.037 9.940 1.477 7.724 12.706 County
Reservation Acres (100,000s) 6.096 1.997 9.128 0.008 22.874 Reservation
Reservation Land in > 2 Counties (Indicator) 0.427 - 0.495 - - Reservation
Observation Counts Total State Courts Tribal Courts
Observations in Panel 17,629 4076 13,553
Observations in Cross-Section 553 128 425
# of States 26 7 22
# of Reservations 105 27 78
Sector-Level Data (Reservation Counties Only)
Mean Median Std Dev 5th %ile 95th %ile Level
Outcome Variables
Logged Sector Income ($ Per Capita) ... Panel (Years 1975-2000) 0.575 0.506 0.373 0.082 1.302 Year-County-Sector
... Cross-Section (Year 2000) 0.783 0.749 0.464 0.000 1.593 County-Sector
External Finance Dependence ... Panel (Year 1975-2000) 5.673 5.413 4.398 0.427 12.634 Year-County-Sector
... Cross-Section (Year 2000) 10.246 10.781 4.645 5.408 18.094 County-Sector
Observation Counts Total State Courts Tribal Courts
Observations in Panel 13,435 3440 9995
Observations in Cross-Section (5 per Reservation) 525 135 390
# of States 26 7 22
# of Reservations 105 27 78
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Table 3: The Effect of Legal Institutions on Credit
Note: This table presents OLS estimation results of the following specification:
Yi = γs +β1resvni +β2statecourti +β3resvni × statecourti + γXi + εi
where each observation is either a reservation headquarters county (resvni = 1), or a county within 20 miles of the reservation headquarters county
(resvni = 0), and statecourti equals one if the reservation is under PL280 state jurisdiction, and zero otherwise. The vector Xi contains logged
county population, size of the reservation in acres, an indicator for whether the reservation has land in more than two counties, and the interaction
between between the multiple county indicator and reservation status to flexibly control for the reservation’s effect on adjacent geography. State
fixed effects are γs. In Panel 1, the dependent variable, bus.crediti, is the logged per capita loans to small businesses (revenues < $1 million) in the
county on average for the years 1997 through 2003 using the FFIEC data. The sample in Panel 1 loses one reservation, Penobscot, because there is
no FFIEC data for this county. In Panel 2, the dependent variable, riskcorei, is the average consumer riskscore (a nationally standardized measure
of consumer creditworthiness based on a proprietary formula calculated by Equifax) in the county taken from the FRBNY - CCP averaged over the
years 1999 through 2003. Standard errors are clustered by reservation area, and ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical significance at the one, five, and
ten percent levels.
Panel 1: Business Credit (FFIEC)
Sub-Samples Overall Sample
log(bus.crediti) reservation adjacent (1) (2) (3) (4)
resvn×statecourt − − 0.355** 0.440*** 0.392** 0.347*
− − (0.171) (0.180) (0.181) (0.180)
resvn − − -0.268*** -0.410*** -0.376*** -0.253**
− − (0.090) (0.090) (0.102) (0.108)
statecourt 0.363** 0.009 0.009 -0.093 0.081 0.060
(0.171) (0.116) (0.116) (0.125) (0.160) (0.036)
Area Controls x x x
State FE x x
Multi-County Controls x
R2 0.035 0.000 0.015 0.092 0.342 0.352
N 104 442 546 546 546 546
Panel 2: Consumer Credit Scores (FRB-NY Consumer Credit Panel)
Sub-Samples Overall Sample
riskscorei reservation adjacent (1) (2) (3) (4)
resvn×statecourt − − 13.06** 12.65** 12.76** 12.79**
− − (5.009) (5.097) (4.949) (4.952)
resvn − − -16.66*** -16.24*** -16.71*** -16.70***
− − (3.794) (3.907) (3.717) (3.725)
statecourt 21.22*** 8.162** 8.162** 9.391** 1.491 1.857
(4.575) (3.927) (3.928) (4.551) (3.410) (3.412)
Area Controls x x x
State FE x x
Multi-County Controls x
R2 0.129 0.025 0.097 0.101 0.502 0.503
N 105 448 553 553 553 553
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Table 4: Robustness to Credit Market Measurement: The Effect of Legal Institutions on Banking
Activity
Note: Panel 1 presents OLS estimation results of the following specification:
bankingib = γs + γb +β1resvni +β2statecourti +β3resvni × statecourti + γXi + εi
where each observation is a combination of a bank, b, and a county, i. The county is either a reservation headquarters county (resvni = 1), or
a county within 20 miles of the reservation headquarters county(resvni = 0), and statecourt equals one if the reservation is under PL280 state
jurisdiction, and zero otherwise. In Panel 1, the dependent variable in columns 1 - 3 is an indicator for there being any lending in county i by bank
b. In columns 4 - 6, the dependent variable is the logarithm of one plus per capita small business lending from the FFIEC data at the bank-county
level. These data used to construct the dependent variables is collapsed to the annual average over the years 1997 through 2003 at the bank-county
level. State fixed effects are γs and bank fixed effects are γb.
Panel 2 presents OLS estimation results for the following specification:
log(1+branches.popi) = γs +β1resvni +β2statecourti +β3resvni × statecourti + γXi + εi
where each observation is a county. The dependent variable branches.popi is the number of full service and retail bank branches (from the FDIC
Summary of Deposits) per 10,000 residents in county i on average for the years 1997 through 2003. Standard errors are clustered by reservation
area, and ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels.
Panel 1: Banking Market Characteristics (FFIEC)
indicator for any lending log(per capita lending)
bankingib (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
resvn×statecourt 0.011** 0.009** 0.009** 0.066** 0.055*** 0.055***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.026) (0.021) (0.021)
resvn -0.004* -0.004** -0.004** -0.031** -0.028** -0.028**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011)
statecourt -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.012 0.000 0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.021) (0.012) (0.012)
Area Controls x x x x x x
State Fixed Effects x x x x
Bank Fixed Effects x x
R2 0.026 0.029 0.127 0.017 0.019 0.133
N 198,360 198,360 198,360 198,360 198,360 198,360
Panel 2: Bank Branching (Summary of Deposits, FDIC)
all banks assets < $250M assets < $100M
log(1+branches.popi) (1) (2) (3)
resvn×statecourt 0.232*** 0.132* 0.133*
(0.083) (0.076) (0.076)
resvn -0.208*** -0.162*** -0.161***
(0.068) (0.054) (0.054)
statecourt 0.030 0.001 0.001
(0.066) (0.052) (0.053)
Area Controls x x x
State FE x x x
R2 0.362 0.198 0.195
N 553 553 553
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Table 5: The Effect of State Courts on Broad Categories of Income (1969-2000)
Note: This table presents OLS estimation results of the following specification:
log(inc.percapit) = γs + γt +β1resvni +β2statecourti +β3resvni × statecourti + γXi + εit
where each observation is either a reservation headquarters county (resvni = 1), or a county within 20 miles of the reservation headquarters
county(resvni = 0), and statecourt equals one if the nearest reservation is under the jurisdiction of state courts (zero otherwise). The vector Xi
contains logged county population and the amount of land in acres of the nearest reservation (both standardized to have mean zero and standard
deviation one to preserve the interpretation of the main effects). The dependent variable is the logarithm of per capita personal or proprietor incomes
from the BEA Regional Economic Information System tables, which we Winsorize at the 99th percentile. The sample is annual from 1969 through
2000. Standard errors are clustered by reservation area. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels.
personal incomes proprietor incomes
year 1969 - 2000 year 2000 year 1969 - 2000 year 2000
reservation adjacent (1) (2) reservation adjacent (3) (4)
resvn × statecourt − − 0.071*** 0.058 − − 0.112*** 0.144**
− − (0.027) (0.038) − − (0.036) (0.070)
resvn − − -0.108*** -0.105*** − − -0.112*** -0.163***
− − (0.022) (0.027) − − (0.026) (0.047)
statecourt 0.107*** -0.025 -0.022 -0.026 0.175** -0.008 -0.001 -0.063
(0.038) (0.030) (0.028) (0.028) (0.079) (0.037) (0.037) (0.075)
State FE x x x x x x x x
Year FE x x x − x x x −
R2 0.953 0.930 0.930 0.363 0.558 0.503 0.505 0.362
N 3293 14,336 17,629 553 3293 14,336 17,629 553
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Table 6: The Effect of Legal Institutions on Sector Income, by External Finance Dependence (1975-
2000)
Note: This table presents OLS estimation results of the following specification:
log(inc.percapi jt) = γi + γ jt +β1statecourti × ext f in jt + εi jt
where the unit of observation is county i, sector j, and year t. The sample is annual from 1975 through 2000, and it includes counties that contain




, is the logarithm of one plus
per capita sector-level incomes from the BEA Regional Economic Information System tables, which we Winsorize at the 99th percentile. The
sample includes economic sectors that have a median personal income across all sample years and counties of greater than $5,000 (manufacturing,
transportation, construction, retail, and services). The independent variable in the specification, ext f in, is calculated in the following four ways
using data from Compustat. In the regression table, extfin is computed by aggregating the ratio of firm-level external finance to total assets over
the past five years, and then computing the median of this firm-level measure at the BEA sector level. Extfin_PCA is the first principal component
of yearly extfin, the industry’s internal cash flow (cf), and fixed investment intensity (capx). Frac_constrained is the share of all firms in each
industry and year that are in the top tercile of the SA index in Hadlock and Pierce (2010). Median.firm.size is log(assets) for the median firm in
the industry-year. For all versions of ext f in, the variable is scaled to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1, indicated by (Z) to ease the
interpretation of regression estimates. Reservation county and economic sector-year fixed effects are γr and γ jt , respectively. Standard errors are
clustered by reservation. Statistical significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels are indicated by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively.
log(inc.percapi jt) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Measures of External Finance Dependence
statecourt×extfin (Z) 0.040*** 0.026*** 0.032***
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
statecourt×extfin_PCA (Z) 0.031*** 0.020** 0.029***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Measures of Financial Constraints
statecourt×frac_constrained (Z) 0.043*** 0.047***
(0.014) (0.015)
statecourt×median_firm_size (Z) -0.047*** -0.051***
(0.015) (0.015)
Sector-Year FE x x x x x x
Reservation County FE x x x x x x
R2 0.639 0.638 0.641 0.641 0.642 0.642
N 13,435 13,435 13,435 13,435 13,435 13,435
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Table 7: Quantifying The Effect of Credit on Income
Note: Panel 1 and Panel 2 present OLS and instrumental variables (IV) estimates of the regression specifications outlined in Tables 5 and 6,
respectively. The level of observation and sample period are the same as in these tables. The regression variables are also the same, except for
log(resvn.credit i), which is the average of small business loans per capita (data from FFIEC) for the reservation county, standardized to have a
mean of zero and a standard deviation of 1 (indicated by Z). We use 2SLS to implement the IV regressions, using the variable statecourti as an
exogenous predictor of log(resvn.credit i) and resvni×statecourti as an exogenous predictor of resvni× log(resvn.crediti). In all IV specifications,
the p-value on the rank-order test (Anderson’s canonical correlations test) is less than 0.1%, and thus, first stage relevance of the instruments is
satisfied. Standard errors are clustered by reservation area. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels.
Panel 1: Personal and Proprietor Incomes (1969-2000)
personal incomes proprietor incomes
OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
resvn×log(resvn.credit) (Z) 0.122*** 0.341*** 0.184** 0.458***
(0.037) (0.042) (0.033) (0.068)
resvn -0.067*** -0.025*** -0.048*** 0.006
(0.015) (0.008) (0.017) (0.013)
log(resvn.credit) (Z) 0.010 -0.50*** 0.025 -0.001
(0.012) (0.016) (0.014) (0.026)
State FE x x x x
Year FE x x x x
R2 0.931 0.924 0.514 0.492
N 17,405 17,405 17,405 17,405
Panel 2: Sector-Level Tests (1975-2000)
OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
extfin (Z)×log(resvn.credit) (Z) 0.025*** 0.100** 0.025*** 0.100***
(0.010) (0.014) (0.010) (0.012)
extfin (Z) 0.067** 0.068** 0.067** 0.068**
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
log(resvn.credit) (Z) 0.066*** 0.060*** - -
(0.019) (0.002) - -
Year FE x x x x
Sector FE x x x x
Reservation County FE x x
R2 0.491 0.446 0.612 0.567
N 13,305 13,305 13,305 13,305
37
Figure 1: Reservation and Surrounding Counties
Note: This figure portrays our crosswalk between reservation headquarters and counties, as well as graphically illustrates the empirical strategy
employed throughout the regression analysis. In both figures, the darkly shaded region is the reservation’s lands according to the TIGER/Line
American Indian / Alaska Native / Native Hawaiian Area Shapefiles (AIANNH) in GIS flat file. We then call the county in which the reservation’s
headquarters locates the reservation’s county (resvn = 1). To illustrate the empirical design, each county in the Lake Traverse Reservation region is
labeled as “tribal court jurisdiction” (statecourt = 0, shaded light green), but only the reservation headquarters county is labeled as resvn = 1. In
the second image, every county in the Hoopa Valley Reservation region is labeled as “state court jurisdiction” (statecourt = 1, shaded light purple),
while the lightly shaded reservation headquarters county is also labeled as resvn = 1.
Lake Traverse Reservation, SD-ND (tribal court jurisdiction)
Hoopa Valley Reservation, CA (state court jurisdiction)
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Figure 2: Reservation Counties Across the United States
Note: This figure portrays our crosswalk between reservation headquarters and counties, as well as graphically illustrates the empirical strategy
employed throughout the regression analysis. In both figures, the darkly shaded region is the reservation’s lands according to the TIGER/Line
American Indian / Alaska Native / Native Hawaiian Area Shapefiles (AIANNH) in GIS flat file. We then call the county in which the reservation’s
headquarters locates the reservation’s county (resvn = 1). To illustrate the empirical design, each county in the Lake Traverse Reservation region is
labeled as “tribal court jurisdiction” (statecourt = 0, shaded light green), but only the reservation headquarters county is labeled as resvn = 1. In
the second image, every county in the Hoopa Valley Reservation region is labeled as “state court jurisdiction” (statecourt = 1, shaded light purple),
while the lightly shaded reservation headquarters county is also labeled as resvn = 1.
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Online Appendix to:
Law and Finance Matter: Lessons From Externally Imposed Courts
(intended for online publication)
A.I Tract-Level Evidence on Race, Geography, and Incomes
Table A.1: Reservation Land and Fraction Non-White
Note: The data come from the 2000 U.S. Census. We restrict the data to census tracts with at least 100 people and to census tracts that have land
area in the county of the reservation’s headquarters (2000 census). We use TIGER/Line American Indian / Alaska Native / Native Hawaiian Area
Shapefiles (AIANNH) in GIS to calculate the census tract’s geographic overlap with the county where the reservation’s headquarters is located
(tract area res overlap)Panel 1 includes census tracts with at least 95 percent of their area on BIA lands. Panel 2 includes census tracts with land in
reservation counties. Statistical significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels are indicated by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively.
Panel 1: Reservation Demographics
state courts tribal courts difference p-value
non-white population (frac) 0.539 0.589 0.049 0.583
N 14 187




tract area res overlap (frac) 0.434***
(0.057)







Table A.2: PL280, Land Area, and Per Capita Personal Incomes
Note: Per capita personal incomes are at the tract level from the 2000 U.S. Census. The other variables are described in A.1. In Panel 1, the
observations are for above median non-white census tracts (observations: state, 24; tribal 176), below median (observations: state 42, tribal 158).
In Panel 2, the observations are for above median non-white census tracts (observations: state, 14; tribal 186) and for below median (observations:
state 52, tribal 148).
Panel 1: Demographics and Personal Incomes (Census Tract Level)
personal incomes
state courts tribal courts difference p-value
census tracts above median non-white population (% pop.) 14,140.8 10,725.0 3,415.8 0.000***
census tracts below median non-white population (% pop.) 19,608.7 19,406.8 201.9 0.865
Panel 2: Reservation Land Area and Personal Incomes (Census Tract Level)
personal incomes
state courts tribal courts difference p-value
census tracts above median overlap w/ reservation area 15,288.0 11,947.7 3,340.3 0.020**
census tracts below median overlap w/ reservation area 18,248.3 18,456.7 -208.4 0.860
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A.II Robustness to Reservation Region Fixed Effects
Table A.3: Robustness to Reservation Region Fixed Effects
Note: This table presents results from an empirical specification that generally is as follows:
Y = γr +β1resvni +β2statecourti +β3resvni × statecourti + γXi + εi.
The precise specifications, variable descriptions, and units of observation are described in the corresponding descriptions of Tables 3, 5, and 6. In
these specifications, reservation area fixed effects replace state fixed effects (when appropriate) from the corresponding tables in the main paper.
Reservation area fixed effects are γr , which involve grouping the reservation headquarter’s county (resvn = 1) with non-reservation counties (resvn =
0) that are within 20 miles according to (Collard-Wexler, 2014). When a non-reservation county lies within 20 miles of two or more reservation
counties, we group the county with the nearest reservation county. Standard errors are clustered by reservation area. Statistical significance at the
one, five, and ten percent levels are indicated by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively.
Panel 1: Credit and Income Regressions (with Reservation Area FE)
Small Business Credit Equifax Credit Score Personal Incomes Proprietor Incomes
1997-2003 (Avg.) 1999-2003 (Avg.) 1969-2000 2000 1969-2000 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
resvn × statecourt 0.353* 14.628** 0.073** 0.062 0.118*** 0.164*
(0.203) (5.676) (0.029) (0.043) (0.041) (0.084)
Control for population and acreage x x x x x x
Reservation Area FE x x x x x x
Year FE − − x − x −
R2 0.342 0.588 0.094 0.519 0.560 0.528
N 546 533 17,629 553 17,629 553
Panel 2: Sector Income Regressions with External Finance (with Reservation Area FE)
1975 - 2000 2000
(1) (2)
extfin (Z) × statecourt 0.040*** 0.058**
(0.011) (0.023)
Control for population and acreage x x
Reservation Area FE x x




A.III Robustness to Clustering by State
Table A.4: Robustness to Clustering Standard Errors by State
Note: This table presents results from an empirical specification that generally is as follows:
Y = γs +β1resvni +β2statecourti +β3resvni × statecourti + γXi + εi.
The precise specifications, variable descriptions, and units of observation are described in the corresponding descriptions of Tables 3, 5, and 6. State
fixed effects are γs. P-values from the cluster robust bootstrap method of Cameron et al. (2008) in parentheses, ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical
significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels.
Panel 1: Credit and Income Regressions (Bootstrap-t Clustering by State)
Small Business Credit Equifax Credit Score Personal Incomes Proprietor Incomes
1997-2003 (Avg.) 1999-2003 (Avg.) 1969-2000 2000 1969-2000 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
res × stjur 0.355* 14.44** 0.071* 0.058 0.112*** 0.144
(0.082) (0.039) (0.084) (0.257) (0.010) (0.143)
Control for population and acreage x x x x x x
State FE x x x x x x
Year FE − − x − x −
R2 0.342 0.491 0.930 0.363 0.505 0.362
N 546 553 17,629 553 17,629 553
Panel 2: Sector Income Regressions with External Finance (Bootstrap-t Clustering by State)
1975 - 2000 2000
(1) (2)
extfin (Z) × stjur 0.040*** 0.058***
(0.004) (0.006)
Control for population and acreage x x
State FE x x




A.IV Panel Data Evidence on Credit
Table A.5: Panel Data Specifications for the Effect of Jurisdiction on Credit
Note: This table presents OLS estimates of the following regression:
Yit = γt +β1resvni +β2statecourti +β3resvni × statecourti + γXi + εit .
The precise variable descriptions and units of observation are described in the corresponding descriptions to Table 3. We estimate panel regressions
with yearly fixed effects (γt ) for the entire range of the FFIEC small business data (1997 - 2005) and FRBNY - CCP consumer riskscores (1999 -
2013). The FFIEC small business data end in 2005 because FFIEC changed its reporting threshold going forward, which makes the measures from
2006 onward not directly comparable to the early years of the sample (see Greenstone and Mas, 2012 for details) Standard errors are clustered by
reservation area. Statistical significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels are indicated by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively.
Small Business Credit (1997-2005) Equifax Riskscore (1999-2013)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
resvn×statecourt 0.495*** 0.403** 0.396** 13.52*** 13.99*** 16.37***
(0.186) (0.181) (0.196) (5.338) (5.026) (5.249)
resvn -0.468*** -0.398*** -0.426*** -17.68*** -18.31*** -21.52***
(0.094) (5.676) (0.029) (4.131) (3.880) (4.291)
statecourt -0.168 - - 7.722 - -
(0.113) (4.665)
Control for population and acreage x x x x x x
Year FE x x x x x x
State FE x x
Reservation Area FE x x
R2 0.209 0.341 0.409 0.160 0.502 0.581
N 5512 5512 5512 33,180 33,180 33,180
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A.V Robustness to using Tobit Estimation – Banking Regressions
Table A.6: The Effect of Legal Institutions on Branching Activity, Robustness to Tobit Estimation
Note: This table is equivalent to Panels 1 and 2 of Table 4, except we use a Tobit model to estimate the equation of interest. Standard errors are
clustered by reservation area, and ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels.
log(per capita lending) (FFIEC) log(branches) (FDIC Sum. Deposits)
all banks assets < $250M assets <$100M
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
resvn×statecourt 0.322** 0.324** 0.261*** 0.145 0.145
(0.177) (0.163) (0.101) (0.132) (0.133)
resvn -0.295*** -0.360*** -0.251*** -0.190*** -0.189***
(0.101) (0.095) (0.083) (0.070) (0.070)
statecourt -0.219** -0.172** 0.078 0.049 0.045
(0.095) (0.087) (0.091) (0.123) (0.124)
Area Controls x x x x x
Bank Fixed Effects x
State Fixed Effects x x x
AIC 44666.6 35682.9 711.7 934.6 947.1
N 198,360 198,360 553 553 553
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A.VI Robustness to Measurement of PL280 Jurisdiction
Table A.7: Robustness to Alternative Classifications of PL280
Note: This table presents results from an empirical specification that generally is as follows:
Y = γs +β1resvni +β2statecourti +β3resvni × statecourti + γXi + εi.
The precise specifications, variable descriptions, and units of observation are described in the corresponding descriptions of Tables 3, 5, and 6.
For each successive regression, we provide a more stringent classification of the variable statecourti. Columns labeled with (1x) are for our main
measure of PL280, which includes optional PL280 reservations with state courts that have authority over civil disputes and excludes retrocessions
and exemptions. Columns labeled with (2x) drop from the sample any optional PL280 reservations. Columns labeled with (3x) also drop from the
sample reservations in Washington that were classified as non-PL280 in our sample, but are subjected to state courts in a limited manner. Finally,
columns labeled with (4x) also drop from the sample reservations with exemptions and retrocessions from PL280 in mandatory PL280 states.
Panel 1: Credit Regressions
Small Business Credit (1997-2003 Avg.) Equifax Credit Score (1999-2003 Avg.)
(1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (1b) (2b) (3b) (4b)
resvn×statecourt 0.392** 0.526** 0.539** 0.533** 12.79** 12.94** 13.80** 14.15**
(0.181) (0.215) (0.218) (0.219) (4.952) (5.478) (5.710) (5.768)
Area Controls x x x x x x x x
State FE x x x x x x x x
R2 0.342 0.354 0.355 0.355 0.503 0.536 0.541 0.542
N 546 464 447 446 553 471 454 453
Panel 2: Income Regressions
Per Capita Income (1969-2000) Properietor Income (1969-2000)
(1c) (2c) (3c) (4c) (1d) (2d) (3d) (4d)
resvn×statecourt 0.071*** 0.057** 0.061** 0.063** 0.112*** 0.122*** 0.117*** 0.115***
(0.027) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.036) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039)
Area Controls x x x x x x x x
State FE x x x x x x x x
Year FE x x x x x x x x
R2 0.930 0.929 0.929 0.929 0.505 0.510 0.513 0.512
N 17,629 15,039 14,495 14,463 17,629 15,039 14,495 14,463
Panel 3: Sector Incomes (Reservation Counties Only, 1975-2000)
Sector Income (1969-2000)
(1e) (2e) (3e) (4e)
extfin (Z)×statecourt 0.047*** 0.043*** 0.041** 0.044**
(0.017) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020)
Reservation FE x x x x
Sector FE x x x x
Year FE x x x x
R2 0.591 0.582 0.575 0.574
N 13,435 11,855 10,815 10,685
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A.VII Characteristics of BEA Sectors
Table A.8: BEA Sectors, two-digit SIC Industries, and External Finance Measures
Note: This table reports the correspondence between BEA sector and two-digit SIC codes, as well as averages across years (1975-2000) of the
measures of external finance used throughout the paper. The variable ext f in_ta is computed by computing the ratio of external funds utilized to
total assets aggregated over the past five years for young firms (<15 years old), and then taking the sector median. The variables capx_ta and c f _ta
are analogous measures based on the past five years of capital expenditures and cash flows. The final column indicates whether the median county
in our data set has personal income in the indicated sector greater than $5000. For comparability to Table 2, these measures are expressed as ratios,
while the main measures are expressed as percentages.
BEA Sector SIC2 ext f in_ta capx_ta c f _ta Median > $5000
Construction 15-17 0.0407 0.0302 0.0463 Yes
Manufacturing 20-39 0.0556 0.0497 0.0487 Yes
Transportation and Utilities 40-42, 44-49 0.0461 0.0863 0.0657 Yes
Retail 52-59 0.0366 0.0737 0.0748 Yes
Services 70, 72-73, 75-76, 78-89 0.0762 0.0551 0.0437 Yes
Ag and Forestry 07-08 0.0231 0.0483 0.1061 No
Mining 10, 12-14 0.1062 0.1554 0.0346 No
Wholesale 50-51 0.0337 0.0309 0.0505 No
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate 60-65, 67 0.0189 0.0066 0.0228 No
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A.VIII Robustness of External Finance Specifications
Table A.9: External Finance Dependence Regressions, Alternative Measures of Financial Constraints
(1975-2000)
Note: The specification and sample period are described in Table 6. The variables extfin and extfin.PCA are also described in Table 6. SA_index is
equal to: SA = −0.737× size+0.043× size2 −0.040×age, where size is the (deflated) log of total assets (in millions of $), age is the number of
years since the firm first appears in Compustat with a non-missing stock price, and the coefficient values are taken from Hadlock and Pierce (2010).
Median.firm.PPE is computed by taking the median of the logged value of property, plant and equipment among firms in sector j (as an alternative
measure of size). These variables are standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 1 (indicated by Z). Statistical significance at
the one, five, and ten percent levels are indicated by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively.
log(inc.percapi jt) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Measures of External Finance Dependence
statecourt×extfin (Z) 0.032*** 0.031***
(0.010) (0.010)
statecourt×extfin.PCA (Z) 0.027*** 0.028***
(0.010) (0.010)
Measures of Financial Constraints
statecourt×SA.index (Z) 0.036*** 0.040***
(0.013) (0.014)
statecourt×median.firm.PPE (Z) -0.036** -0.042***
(0.014) (0.014)
Sector-Year FE x x x x
Reservation FE x x x x
R2 0.641 0.640 0.640 0.640
N 13,435 13,435 13,435 13,435
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Table A.10: External Finance Dependence Regressions, Alternative Financing Measures (1975-2000)
Note: The specification and sample period are described in Table 6. The variables extfin and extfin_PCA are also described in Table 6. Capx is
median sector-year level fixed investment intensity, cashflow is median sector-year level internal cash flows, and oplev is median sector-year level
operating leverage, all computed analogously to the external finance measures. These variables are standardized to have a mean of zero and a
standard deviation of 1 (indicated by Z). Statistical significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels are indicated by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively.
log(inc.percapi jt) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
statecourt × extfin (Z) 0.040*** 0.072*** 0.042*** 0.072***
(0.011) (0.016) (0.011) (0.016)
statecourt×extfin.PCA (Z) 0.032*** 0.084*** 0.033*** 0.084***
(0.010) (0.019) (0.011) (0.019)
statecourt×capx (Z) -0.044** -0.070** -0.046** -0.072***
(0.019) (0.023) (0.020) (0.024)
statecourt×cashflow (Z) 0.052*** 0.069*** 0.055** 0.072***
(0.016) (0.019) (0.019) (0.022)
statecourt×oplev (Z) 0.007 0.007 -0.005 -0.005
(0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012)
Sector-Year FE x x x x x x x x
Reservation FE x x x x x x x x
R2 0.639 0.613 0.641 0.641 0.639 0.638 0.641 0.641
N 13,435 13,435 13,435 13,435 13,435 13,435 13,435 13,435
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Table A.11: The Effect of Legal Institutions on Sector Income (1975-2000), External Finance Depen-
dence Measures Based on Principal Components
Note: The first panel reports results from the specification with year and reservation area fixed effects:
log(inc.percapi jt) = γi + γ jt +β1statecourt× ext f in_PCA+β2statecourt× internal.PCA+ εi jt
The sample period and units of observation are described in Table 6 The variable ext f in.PCA is the first principal component of{
ext f in jt ,c f jt ,capx jt
}
, and internal.PCA is the second principal component of these sector-level balance sheet aggregates. Variables indicated
with a (Z) have been scaled to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Standard errors are clustered by reservation area. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗
indicate statistical significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels.
log(inc.percapi jt) (1) (2) (3)
statecourt×extfin.PCA (Z) 0.031*** 0.024**
(0.010) (0.011)
statecourt×internal.PCA (Z) -0.028** -0.018
(0.012) (0.014)
Sector-Year FE x x x
Reservation County FE x x x
R2 0.638 0.638 0.638
N 13,435 13,435 13,435
xi
